PGP keys signed by me so I don't have to validate the same keys again-and-again and can just trust my own paper verified fingerprint in the subsequent validations. Includes keys used within PPFI such as Matterbridge and KeePassXC.
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README.md

pgp-alt-wot

PGP keys signed by me so I don't have to validate the same keys again-and-again and can just trust my own paper verified fingerprint in the subsequent validations.

WoT? Web Of Trust

Why?

For example, I use Tor Browser everywhere and download it directly from their website. They have signed it using GPG (a OpenPGP implementation) and to ensure it hasn't been tampered with, I have to check that signature and I have two options:

This second method is also encouraged by Tails.

What if I am wrong and trust the wrong key? I think I am less likely to trust a wrong key by verifying it carefully and signing it once than verifying it separately every time. However if I do sign a wrong key, I can always revoke my signature and then publish the key with my revocation signature on public keyservers (which I don't usually do, while I cannot control what people do with the signatures from this repository).

Inclusion policy

  • I am reasonably certain that the key belongs to whom it claims to belong to or I trust the key to belong to whomever it belongs to.
  • I have some need of the key or have attended keysigning party with the key owner.
  • me/me.asc is just my key and place where I try to keep all signatures it has received. Symlinks are legacy reasons and other me's are also me.

Places to check for keys

  • GitHub, Gitea and GitLab expose user public keys when you append a .gpg after their profile page (.keys for SSH).
  • The Internet Archive's Waybackmachine is always a good place too especially when using together with official websites.
  • Some people have similar projects or webpages for this purpose

Mirrors

See also